It is rarely appreciated that Canada’s army ended the Second War as one of the most highly mechanized armies in the world. To a great degree, this accomplishment was owed to the many versions of small, lightly-armoured, tracked Carriers that were employed. The Carrier story is complex and, rather than re-invent the wheel, I have chosen to quote from several sources.

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The following section is quoted with permission from Gary J. Kennedy’s
http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com

The Universal Carrier is perhaps one of the most misunderstood instruments of the World War Two battlefield. It does not neatly fit into any established class of armoured fighting vehicle. It is perhaps most often thought of as an armoured personnel carrier, but this is misleading. It may be more accurately described as an armoured machine gun carrier. The role of an APC, as typified by the halftrack of the period, was to transport a Squad [Section] sized unit over rough terrain under some degree of protection from small arms’ fire and shell bursts. Such machines were employed en masse to mechanise an entire Infantry Battalion, bestowing previously undreamt of mobility.

The unique concept of the Universal Carrier Platoon was to provide every Infantry Battalion with the ability to move a small portion of its establishment under armoured protection. The men of the Rifle Platoons could not pile into the vehicles as they could do with halftracks. Each Carrier had its own Bren gun team and was intended to operate in a fire support role for the walking infantrymen, rather than act as their transportation. In reality, the Carrier served in a host of other less offensive but equally vital roles.

The idea was that the Carrier could transport a Bren team to a position where they could dismount and begin covering fire. The armour of the Carrier was proof against bullets and shell splinters. It was not proof against airbursts or grenades, as the machine had no overhead cover. This was partly to facilitate the dismount and partly to save weight, and it was a weakness shared by both German and American halftrack carriers.

As with more conventional support weapons, the question of whether the Carriers should be deployed as a single force or hived off to the Rifle Companies arose. A compromise generally emerged, in which the one or two Main Effort Companies received a Section apiece, with the resultant balance being retained as a Battalion reserve under the Platoon Commander.

As there was no precedent for the Carrier, there was a certain amount of puzzlement as to its most profitable deployment. In the early days of the war, German and Italian anti-tank weapons were far less common. This encouraged some units to use their Carriers boldly, taking full advantage of the enemy’s lack of resistance to even lightly armoured vehicles. The higher echelons of the Army were most critical of these uses, regarding the Carrier Platoon as a valuable asset that should be preserved. Commanders in the field were constantly admonished not to think of their Carriers as either Scout Cars or light tanks. This undoubtedly left some wondering just what use the machine was. This cautious approach became more understandable as the war progressed. German anti-tank weapons mushroomed from a handful of negligible rifles to scores of grenades and shoulder launched weapons. The Carrier was operating in an increasingly armour hostile environment not envisioned during its pre-war development.

Where a Carrier Section of three machines was placed under the command of a Rifle Company, the Company Commander could utilise it in a number of ways. Firstly, he could take advantage of the addition of three more Bren guns, a PIAT and a 2 inch mortar to ‘thicken the fire of his Fire Platoon’. This unit provided a base of fire under cover of which the remaining Rifle Platoons would advance. The support weapons of the Carrier Section could literally double the firepower…. Mobility was a key element in the survival of the Carrier on the battlefield, so when operating in this manner the crews would fire dismounted, the Carriers being held back out of enemy view. At a push, the Section could take over the role of the Fire Platoon, though this was a risky move as with only 13 men at full strength the Section was vulnerable to infantry assault.

The mobile role took several forms. Chief among these saw the Carriers moving with the Main Effort Platoons, some distance behind them rather than leading the way. At the order of the Company Commander, they would move to a flank position and lay down fire with their Bren guns to cover the advance of a Rifle Platoon. Other more adventurous options saw the Carriers deployed to cut off an enemy retreat by swinging round a flank, or making a feint attack to draw what must have been unwelcome hostile intention.